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NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS

THE TRACT INDEX AND NOTICE IN NORTH DAKOTA
RIcHARD C. MAXWELL

*

The present provisions of the North Dakota statutes I requiring the keeping of a tract index -to the instruments recorded in the office of the register of deeds are older than the
state itself. The system we know as a tract index was referred
to in the territorial codes by the term, numerical index,2 but
the forms set out there for accomplishing this type of indexing
are identical with those used today. The grantor and grantee
method of indexing, which grew of necessity out of the accumulating deposit of records with the early recording officers,
antedates, of course, the tract index ;s and, in spite of the long
history of the tract index in North Dakota, the register of
deeds is still required to keep an index in the grantor and

4
grantee form in this state.

The tract index, set up as it is to show directly the instruments which have affected the title to a specific geographical
unit of land, is especially appropriate in a state which is, as
North Dakota, formed entirely from the public domain and
surveyed by the rectangular system used by. the General Land
Office of the United States.5 The grantor and grantee index,
on the other hand, based on alphabetical entries of instruments
according to the last names of individual grantors and grantees, is far less convenient 6 and is being replaced in some older
areas of the United States by indexes of the tract type.'
The existence of a tract index in a jurisdiction has a significance that goes beyond the question of convenience .to those
engaged in searching the records. Many of the rules governing priorities of purchasers of real estate under the recording
acts have their basis in a consideration. of the difficulty of
discovering instruments recorded in various situations by the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
1 N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 11-1807.
2

Dakota Code, Political Code c. 21, See. 58, 59 (1877).

S Fairchild, Improvement in Recording and Indezing Methods for Real Prop-

erty Instruments, 28 GA. L. J. 807 (1939).
4 N. D. Rev. Code (1943) See. 11-1808.
s For a discussion of this system see Ruemnele, Origin of Surveys in North
Dakota, 24 N. D. BAR BRaxs 102 (1948).
a PATTON, TiTsm See. 42 (1938).
7Fairchild, supra note 3
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use of the available indexing, system. This paper is concerned primarily with the history of the tract index in relation to the problem of priorities in North Dakota.
In the absence of a recording act, common law theory determines priorities between interests in land by the order of
the time of their creation9 In equity the doctrine was. developed that a purchaser for value of a legal interest without
notice of a prior equitable interest would prevail. 10 It is usually
stated that the purpose of the recording acts was to force instruments upon the record' so that a complete history of the
title could, be gained by a prospective purchaser making a
proper search." The method adopted of accomplishing this end
was to change the rules of priority to favor the recorded instrument. The recording statute in North Dakota, for example,
makes "Every conveyance of real estate not recorded . . .
void .as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith, and
for a valuable consideration . . whose conveyance...
first is recorded . . ." 2 A cursory examination of this statute
will reveal that two main elements are required to*bring a
purchaser within its protection: first, he must have paid a
valuable consideration while having no notice of a prior right;
second, he must have recorded the instrument on which his
right is based before the instrument representing the prior
right is recorded. Provisions of this type have been characterized as "notice-race" statutes as distinguished from enactments which can be called "notice" statutes, under which a
"subsequent purchaser . . . bears but one burden, that of
taking his, deed without knowledge of the prior conveyance . ." 13 One more statutory element that must be included in our background for discussion of the North Dakota
cases is the provision that proper recording of an instrument

8For an excellent general treatment of priorities under the recording acts
see Philbrck, Limits of Record Search and Therefore of Notice, 93 U. oF PA. I.
Riv. 125, 259, 891 (1944).
9 2 WALSH, RzAL Peomy dec. 216 (1947).
10 2 id n. 1. There has been a diversity of opinion as to the application of the
doctrine of bona fide purchasers to successive equitable interests.' Ames, Purchase
for Value Without Notice, 1 HAuv. L. REv. 1 (1887);

McCLITOrCK, EQuiTy See.

26 n. 9 (2d ed. 1948).
112 WALSH, op. cit. supra note 9, at 489; Philbrick' supra note 8, at 127; see
Baird v. Stubbins, 58 N. D. 351, 355, 226 N. W. 529 (1929.
12 N. D. Rev. Code (1948) See. 47-1941; Enderlin Investment Co. v. Nord-

hagen, 18 N. D-517, 123 N. W. 390 (1909).
IsPhilbrick, supra note 8, at 159.
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is "constructive notice of the execution of such instrument to
all purchasers and encumbrancers subsequent to the recording."

1,

The first important event in the history of the tract index
in North Dakota is the case of Doran v. Dazey.15 In October
1884 one Dazey was negotiating with certain Nelsons for the
sale of property in the city of Fargo. When the terms of the
sale were agreed upon the Nelsons executed a warranty deed
to Dazey which was properly recorded. Dazey, however, did
not give .the agreed consideration immediately, but sought
legal advice as to the state of the title. The report of the title
submitted by his attorneys was not favorable. The defect
which the attorneys considered important was the fact that
recorded title was not in the Nelsons. This was remedied by the
execution of a deed from the record owners to one of the
Nelsons. There was another defect which had apparently been
revealed by an examination of the tract index; one Sims had
given a mortgage on the property. Since, however, there was
nothing else inthe record to connect Sims with the title to the
property, Dazey's attorneys advised him to go ahead with the
transaction. He then paid his consideration. Actually, Sims
was the grantee in a deed made by the record owners in August 1883 which was unrecorded until September 1887. Doran,
claiming under this deed, brought suit to cancel the deeds to
Dazey as clouds on his title. In the absence of the recording act
Doran would obviously prevail; the conveyance to Sims in
1883 took title out of the chain under which Dazey claims.
The recording act protects subsequent prior recording purchasers for value without notice of unrecorded instruments
affecting the title to realty. Dazey seems to be in that class if he
can be said to be without notice -of the prior unrecorded deed.
The only basis, of course, for impugning the good faith of
Dazey-4s his knowledge of the recorded mortgage made by
Sims. This was enough in the lower court and Doran prevailed. On appeal, the Supreme Court rested its affirmance on
constructive notice in Dazey resulting from his failure to make
the inquiry suggested by his actual notice of the recorded mortgage. The opinion accents the statement that had Dazey "not
actually known that such a mortgage was on record,

14

N. D. Rev. Code (1943)

See. 47-1945.

15 5 N. D. 167, 64 N. W. 1023 (1895).

...

the
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mere recording of the mortgage would not have constituted
constructive notice of it, within the meaning of the recording
law." It may well be asked why the "mere recording" of the
mortgage in the circumstances of this case would not have
amounted to constructive notice of it within the terms of the
recording act. The court gives an answer: "The recording of
an instrument out of the chain of title does not constitute such
constructive notice. This is well settled." The rule stated by
the court is well settled in situations like Doran v. Dazey -in jurisdictions where the grantor and grantee index is the
only access provided to the recorded instruments.16 Under such
circumstances the discovery of an instrument given by one who
is not in the line of succession from a common grantor would
be mere accident unless the searcher were required to go beyond the systematic use of his index and examine the recorded
instruments one by one.17 It seems fair to suggest that in a
jurisdiction where the indexing system lists instruments according to the land which they affect rather than according
to the names of their grantors and grantees, rules developed
with relation to the latter type of index should not be adopted
without full consideration of the reasons for them.
Since the foundation of Doran's claim was the unrecorded
deed of 1883, not the recorded mortgage from Sims, actual
notice of the mortgage was not enough. It was necessary for
the court to go a step further, finding the actual notice of the
mortgage sufficient, in the words of the statute "to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact, and . . . constructive notice of the fact itself." 18 The statement of the
court as to the nugatory effect as constructive notice of an instrument out of the chain of title seems properly characterized
as a dictum, since an opposite opinion on this point would not
have changed the result of the case. If the court had found
that the existence of a tract index, making all instruments
equally accessible to reasonable search, made the concept of
chain of title as developed in relation to the grantor and grantee index inapplicable; and if the usual statutory effect of
constructive notice from recorded instruments had been given
to the mortgage, 10 it seems that the state of the record would
16 PATTON, op. cit. aupra note 6, See. 44.
172 WALSH, op. cit. supra note 9, Sec. 221.
is N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 1-0125.
10 N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 47-1945.
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have been such as to place on Dazey "the duty of making inquiry regarding the rights," of Doran and the parties through
whom his claims were derived.2 0 Doran v. Dazey, with its
dictum, left the tract index a mere convenience for. the searcher which could be ignored with impunity, but which, if consulted, would cause the purchaser to lose his bona fide status
to the extent of the information derived therefrom.
This anomalous situation was not allowed to continue long.
The legislature in 1899 found that "an emergency exists in
that instruments are frequently found of record out of the
chain of title, which are a cloud upon such title,"-" and proceded to amend section 3598 of the Revised Code of 1895 to
read: "An unrecorded instrument is valid between the parties
thereto and those who have notice thereof; but knowledge of
the record of an instrument out of the chain of title does not
constitute such notice." 22 Although a subsequent opinion 23
states that this amendment "adopted the rule announced in
Doran v. Dazey . . . , " it is obvious that the enactment had
the effect "of changing the rule announced . . . in Doran v.
Dazey . . . (in which) it was held that actual knowledge of
the record of an instrument-out of the chain of title was constructive notice of the original instrument. and of the rights
of the parties under it.... -2, It might, of course, be said that
this statute adopts the dictum in Doran v. Dazey, since if actual knowledge of the record of a deed out of the chain of title
does not constitute notice, it can be inferred that the mere
existence of such a record does no more. If this is true, the
statute appears to bring into the law of North Dakota many
of the subtleties of recording act priorities that have developed
from the difficulties of search inherent in the grantor and
grantee index. The remainder of this article will be devoted to a
comparison of the results obtained in some of the reported
cases *'nthis field from other tract index jurisdictions with the

20 Northwestern Mut. Say. & L. Ass'n -v. Hanson, 72 N. D. 629, 636, 10 N. W.
2d 599 (1943); PATToN, op. cit. eupra Note 6, See. 19.
21 In North Dakota statutes are declared to be emergency measures to get the
benefit of a constitutional provision causing them to take effect at an earlier time
than ordinary enactments. N. D. CONST. See. 67.
22 N. D. Rev. Code (1943) See. 47-1946.
23 McCoy v. Davis, 38 N. D. 328, 337, 164 N. W. 951 (1917).

2,4 See Simonson v. Wenzel, 27 N. D. 638, 645, 147 N. W. 804 (1914).
are the court's.)

(Italics
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probable results in similar situations in North Dakota.2

1

6 the South Dakota court
In Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Tinker2
gave the tract index in that state full scope. Faced with the
problem of the effect to be given to the recording of a mortgage
from the holder of an equitable title not of record at the time
the mortgage was given, the court found that a subsequent
purchaser's title was "subject to the lien of that mortgage."
The case differs from Doran v. Dazey in that the South Dakota
purchaser had not examined the record title. There is, therefore, no question of actual notice of the recorded instrument
and the case is a clear holding contra to the constructive notice
dictum in Doran v. Dazey. Authorities cited to the South Dakota court holding "that a party purchasing property is only
charged with constructive notice of conveyances made in the

chain of title . . . ." were disposed of by the statement that

such "decisions cannot be regarded as authority in this court,
not having been made in states haVing provisions . . . re-

quiring numerical indexes as in our Code." 21 Doran v. Dazey
was apparently overlooked by our South Dakota brethren.
Perhaps the result in the Fullerton case is not preferable to
the contrary result which would have been reached in the present state of North Dakota law. The case does, howeve, place
its conception of constructive notice from the record on the
realities of recording and indexing as they exist in both North
and South Dakota, recognizing that if convenience of title
search in real estate transactions is the criteria, the rules developed under one system of indexing do not necessarily have
universal application.
The Supreme Court of Wyoming in Batch v. Arnold 28 had to
consider the problem of the tract index in relation to a recorded deed made by a grantor who was at the time of the
25 Oklahoma has apparently reached the same result as the North Dakota
court did in Doran v. Dazey. Perkins v. Cissell, 32 Oki. 827, 124 P. 7 (1912);
see Anthis v. Sandlin, 149 Oki. 126, 299 P. 458 (1931). ("While this notice filed
of record when called to the attention of the subsequent purchaser he will be
deemed to have actual notice, but was insufficient as constructive notice for the
reason It was not executed by anyone within the chain of title"). Oklahoma provides for a tract index. Oki. Stat. Ann., tit. 19, Sec. 291 (1941).
2522 S. D. 427, 118 N. W. 700 (1908).
27 Id. at 432. Compare Parrish v. Mahany, 10 S. D. 276, 73 N. W. 97 (1897).
See Philbrick, supra note 8, at 169 to the effect that "'subsequent purchaser'" in
a state having only a grantor and grantee index means "subsequent purchaser of
the same land tracing title through a common grantor," while in a tract index
state it means "subsequent purchaser of the same land."
289 Wyo. 17, 59 P. 434 (1899).
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conveyance neither the actual owner nor the owner of record.
The first conveyance in that case was a mortgage given and
recorded before the mortgagor took title from the United
States; a second mortgage was given after title had been acquired. The question of priority between the mortgages arose
in a suit to foreclose the second mortgage. The court found the
situation to be one for the application of the doctrine of estoppel by deed, 29 and the version of that doctrine applied apparently resulted in the creation of an equitable right in a
purchaser from a non-owner by the non-owner's acquisition of
title. The question of the standing of the second mortgagee as
a purchaser without notice to cut off this equity was resolved
in favor of the equity of the first mortgagee. The court found
that the existence of a tract index made the failure "to search
further than the vesting of the legal title in the purchaser's
grAntor . . . such inexcusable negligence as to amount to a
willful refusal to receive any information as to the rights or
interests of other claimants." It is possible that North Dakota,
in spite of its negative- rule as to the effect of the facilities
of the tract index on notice, might reach the same result. Our
code provision on after acquired title states that when "a person purports by proper instrument to grant real property in
fee simple and subsequently acquires any title or claim of
title thereto, the same passes by operation of law to the grantee
or his successors." so This provision seems to make an estoppel by deed in North Dakota carry legal title to the grantee immediately on acquisition by the grantor of title. If the
legal title, immediately upon acquisition by the grantor, passed
to the first grantee, there would be no interest left in the grantor to pass to a subsequent grantee. This result was, in fact,
reached in a state without a tract index, in which the effect
of the application of the estoppel by deed doctrine was held
to be -the same as it seems to be under the North Dakota
statute. 1 Any discussion of what the proper result is in these
situations should be tempered by recording act provisions and
policies.8 2 In most cases dealing with grantor and grantee indexes alone, subsequent purchasers have not been given the
.0 On the forms of title by estoppel see 2 WAlSH, op. cit. sura note 9, at Sec.

226.
30 N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 47-1015.
a1 McCusker v. McEvey, 9 R. I. 528 (1870); dissenting opinion in 10 R. I. 606

(1872).
82

Comment, 16 CA.xuv. L. Rcv. 341 (1928).
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burden of searching the record prior to the time that the
grantors in their chain got title to determine if any deed or
mortgage has been given prior to that date. 33 If it is an unreasonable burden on a subsequent purchaser to require such
a search, the use of the doctrine of estoppel by deed to give
priority to a purchaser from a grantor in the chain of title
prior to acquisition of title by that grantor runs counter to
the policy of the recording act tb furnish a record on which
reliance can be put in entering into real estate transactions.
In a tract index state, such as South Dakota, the opposite result, that is, priority being given to the first purchaser, can
be reached in harmony with the policy of the recording system.
In reaching this result, the South Dakota court pointed out
that under the numerical index system "abstracts will necessarily show all the conveyances made of the property." 34 Since
in North Dakota the record of a deed found only by way of
the tract index is apparently not notice, actual or constructive, it would seem incongruous to give priority to the first
purchaser in the Batch v. Arnold situation. Although on common law principles,85 the first taker of the legal title will prevail over subsequent purchasers regardless of notice; such a
result can be squared with recognized recording act policy only
if the first taker of the legal title also first records in such a
manner that the required search will apprise an intending
purchaser as to the state of the title. Since in North Dakota the
rules applicable to grantor and grantee indexes appear to have
been adopted by statute, 36 the recording of an instrument from
a grantor who does not yet have title should logically be of no
effect whatsoever, even though the tract index obviates the
difficulties of search in this situation.
Another question of interest to purchasers relying on a
tract index was decided by the Supreme Court of Utah in
Boyer v. Pahvant Mercantile & Investment Co.87 There the
omission by the recording officer to properly enter an instrument in the *tract index did not destroy the effect of recording since the court found that there had been a sufficient
entry in the grantor and grantee index. A dissenting judge felt
3 PATTON, op. cit. supra note 6, See. 45.
34 Bernady v. Cal. & U. S. Mortgage Co., 17 S. D. 637, 98 N. W. 166 (1904).
s5 See text to note 9 eupra, et seq.
86 See text to note 23 supra, et seq.

87 76 Utah 1, 287 P. 188 (1930).
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that the effect of the decision was "to overlook the practice
of relying on the abstract record and indices and to ignore the
fundamental design. of our recording acts." 38 The court in the
Boyer case did not have. to answer the question as to who
would sustain the loss resulting from an omission of duty by
the recording officer, or the question whether proper: indexing is essential to constructive notice; 40 the decision does,
however, cast considerable doubt on the safety of relying .on
the tract index alone in making a title search in Utah. The
question of the effect of failure to enter notations of' instruments in the tract index was raised in the North Dakota case of
McHugh v. Haley ,1 where a register of deeds failed to indicate
the effect of an instrument as giving an easement over various
lots. In an action to quiet title to the easement, the defendant
interposed the defense of his reliance on an abstract compiled,
apparently, from the incorrect tract index, but the court
found the condition of the premises sufficient to impart notice
to the defendant and did not decide the issues raised by the defense of improper indexing. -The court, however, cites North
Dakota cases which indicate that the loss resulting from errors
of the- recording officer falls on the subsequent purchaser,4 '
and that reliance on the tract index alone is not such contributory negligence as would bar an action against a register of
deeds for damages resulting from failure to make proper en
tries in such index.4 3 The adoption of the dicta in these cases
as the law of North Dakota would leave us in accord with the
Utah court as to the result in a situation like the Boyer case,
but the subsequent purchaser would 'have an action against
the erring register of deeds for damages incurred by reliance
on the erroneous tract index. In other words, the subsequent
18
Id, 287 P. at 199.

RErn,
PRoPERTY Sec. 1273 (3d ed. 1939). There is authority in Utah that the subsequent
89 TIP-e is considerable difference of opinion on this point. 5, TIFFANY-.

purchaser is protected. Drake v. Reggel, 10 Utiah 376, 37 P. 583 (1894).
40 This question is discussed in 23 CALiF. L. Rgv. 107 (1934).
41611 N. D. 359, 237 N. W. 835 (1931). It should be noted that as to the prob.
lem of the extent of required search in relation to conveyances by common
grantors ereating datements in retained land now the subject of purchase, various
grantor and grantee jurisdictions have reached different results. See Philbrick,
supra note 8, at 171. If a tract index is meticulously kept, no difficulties of overburdening search requirements appear. A deed creating a fee in one lot with an
easement appurtenant in a lot retained by a grantor would be entered on the tract
index in relation to both lots.
"2 See Atlas Lumber Co. v. Canadian-American Mortg.- & T. Co.. 36 N. D. 39,
48, 161 N. W. 604 (1917).
4s See Rising and Isaacs v. Dickinson, 18 N. D. 478, 480, 121 N. W. 616 (1909).
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purchaser would have constructive notice in spite of tne error
in'the records, but would be considered to have made a proper
4

search. '

Although portions of this paper may be interpreted as criticism of recording law in North Dakota, its purpose has been
merely the exposition of what a portion of this law appears to
be. It would be presumptuous to make recommendations for
important changes in the land law of North Dakota based
upon so slight a study as this one. It seems fair, however, to
raise the question whether the development of that law has had
as a basis sufficient consideration of the policies to be effectuated of all the possibilities inherent in North Dakota's
advanced system for the indexing of real estate transactions.

44 It should be noted that California with a similar statutory structure has
reached a result contra to that which is here indicated for North Dakota as to
the constructive notice imported by an instrument deposited with the register of
deeds but improperly dealt with by that officer. See 23 CALIP. L. REv. 107 (1934).
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